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Voluntary action requires consciousness 
Consider the following cases: 
1. On the morning of January 1 1961, Willis Boshears strangled a young woman to 
death. It was determined beyond reasonable doubt that he performed this violent act, 
but he was nevertheless acquitted of the charge of murder (Shearer, 1961).  
2. On the morning of May 24th, 1987, Kenneth James Park drove over 20 km to his 
mother-in-law’s home and stabbed her to death. Once again, it was determined 
beyond reasonable doubt that he performed this violent act, but he too was acquitted 
on the charge of murder (Broughton, 1994).  
3. On a July night in 2008, Brian Thomas strangled his wife to death. And again, 
although there was no doubt that he strangled his wife, a jury found him to be not 
guilty of murder (Morris, 2009).  
In cases 1, 2, and 3, the defendant performed a morally repugnant, violent action against another 
person, yet the courts determined that the defendant was not guilty of a crime. In all three cases, 
the expressed reason why the defendant was not guilty was that the defendant did not voluntarily 
perform the violent action because the defendant was not consciously aware of any aspect of his 
action. A key part of this line of thought is captured by the following principle:  
V: Voluntary action requires consciousness.  
The following schema represents the gist of my argument for V, where è is transitive and 
means “requires”: 
Voluntary action è Voluntary attention è Consciousness 
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I will devote section one of this essay to a discussion of attention. In section two, I will provide 
support for the hypothesis that voluntary attention is necessary for voluntary action. In section 
three, I will discuss consciousness. In section four, I will provide support for the hypothesis that 
consciousness is necessary for voluntary attention. In section five, I will use the key takeaways 
from sections one through four to argue that voluntary action requires consciousness. In section 
six, I will discuss some research on the subjective feeling of voluntariness and the causal 
connection between consciousness and action. The purpose of this discussion is to show that the 
feeling of voluntariness may be the phenomenal counterpart to the functional role that 
consciousness plays in voluntary action. In section seven, I will present a theoretical narrative 
about the cognitive processes involved in voluntary action which involves goals, consciousness, 
attention, and action. In section seven, I will unpack some experimental predictions and 
philosophical features, as well as theoretical flaws, of this narrative about voluntary action.  
§1: Attention 
The amount of information available for processing by the human brain at a given time is 
astounding. For example, it has been estimated that the information transfer rate of the human 
eyes is 108-109 bits per second (Borji & Itti, 2013; K. Koch et al., 2006)! But the human brain 
does not simply process visual information. It is also bombarded with information feeds from 
transducers in the other sensory organs, such as feeds of auditory, tactile, olfactory, and 
proprioceptive signals. Furthermore, there are vast numbers of endogenous signals, originating 
from within the brain, which represent thoughts, emotions, desires, intentions, and other mental 
states. Even if it were biologically possible for the brain to deeply process all this information—
such that the information has a significant influence on subsequent behavior and mentation—
doing so would yield highly incoherent memories, experiences, and behaviors. So, to respond 
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coherently and intelligently to this mass amount of information, the brain must select a proper 
subset of the available information for enhanced processing. A basic conception of attention, one 
that is shared by most contemporary theories of the process, identifies it with this process of 
selection (for a review of such theories, see Carrasco, 2011).  
One neurally plausible theory of attention treats it as a process of ‘biased competition’ 
(Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Webb & Graziano, 2015). According to this account, signals 
compete with one another for enhanced processing and the signals that win this competition are 
attended. The existence of this sort of competitive processing is consistent with the organization 
and patterns of activity of cells in the retina (Hartline, Wagner, & Ratliff, 1956; Kuffler, 1953) 
and visual cortex (Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000; Moran & Desimone, 1985; Reynolds, Chelazzi, 
& Desimone, 1999). An important aspect of this competition for enhanced processing is that it is 
biased. A signal is selected for enhanced processing—that is, attended—if and only if its strength 
exceeds some threshold. Bottom-up features of stimuli and top-down goals both contribute to the 
amplification of signals beyond this threshold. In this sense, bottom-up features and top-down 
goals can bias the signal competition by amplifying the strength of some signals, making them 
more likely than other signals to be selected for enhanced processing.  
Attention—that is, the selection of signals for enhanced processing—can be involuntary 
or voluntary. In the case of involuntary attention—sometimes referred to as attentional capture 
(Wu, 2011)—the signal competition described above is influenced by “bottom-up” properties of 
the stimulus, such as its brightness, contrast, or intensity. In the case of voluntary attention, the 
signal competition is biased by a person’s goals, intentions, desires, plans, and the like. For 
simplicity, I will hereafter refer to all such mental states as “goals”. In terms of neural correlates, 
studies of human and primate brains show that a bilateral network including the dorsal posterior 
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parietal cortex (PPC) and frontal cortex is engaged during the deployment of top-down biases of 
attention (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). Additionally, studies using electroencephalography (EEG) 
show an increase in activity in the gamma range (30-70 Hz) during voluntary, but not 
involuntary, attention (Landau, Esterman, Robertson, Bentin, & Prinzmetal, 2007).  The 
existence of dissociable neural correlates of these phenomena warrants us in being more 
confident that they are really distinct. 
§2: Voluntary action requires voluntary attention 
A first-pass definition of voluntary action is: 
VA: A person P voluntarily performs an action A if and only if P performs A and P     
         possesses the goal to perform A. 
One problem with this definition is that it does not specify the type of causal connection that 
obtains between a goal and action in the case of voluntary action. Intuitively, it cannot be a mere 
accident that one’s goal to perform A leads one to perform A (Wu, 2016). An example which 
pumps this intuition is one in which a man has a goal to murder his uncle. The man then gets 
very nervous because of this goal, so nervous that he accidentally runs over a pedestrian who 
happens to be his uncle, with his car (Chisholm, 1966). Despite his having the goal to kill his 
uncle, and his succeeding in doing so, it does not seem that he voluntarily killed his uncle. The 
explanation for this is that his goal to kill was not causally related to the killing “in the right sort 
of way” (Wu, 2016). So, definition VA is inadequate.  
 Wayne Wu’s (2016) solution to the problem of specifying the type of causal connection 
between goal and action, which must obtain for an action to be voluntary, is to incorporate 
attention into the story. In the case of voluntary action, goals and actions are connected via 
voluntary attention. Voluntary attention involves the enhanced processing of goal-relevant 
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signals—processing which enables these signals to drive behavior. So, according to Wu, the 
missing link in the causal chain in Chisholm’s example is attention. On this view, when one 
performs a voluntary action A, one possess a goal G to perform A and G influences attention to 
enhance the processing of G-relevant signals, which in turns enables these signals to drive 
behavior. Attention is needed for the systematic coordination of goal-oriented action. That is, 
voluntary action requires voluntary attention. 
Consistent with the above ideas is an extensive amount of literature which demonstrates 
the effects of attention on the control of bodily movements (Lohse, Jones, Healy, & Sherwood, 
2014). For example, attentional focus has been shown to affect the activity of muscle cells 
measured using electromyography (EMG) (Lohse & Sherwood, 2012; Vance, Wulf, Töllner, 
McNevin, & Mercer, 2004; Zachry, Wulf, Mercer, & Bezodis, 2005). Additionally, attentional 
focus has been shown to affect energetic costs of movement as measured by oxygen 
consumption (Schücker, Hagemann, Strauss, & Völker, 2009), the variability of the kinematics 
of joints (Lohse, Sherwood, & Healy, 2010), and the control of gait (Woollacott & Shumway-
Cook, 2002). Additionally, there are numerous studies showing that an external focus of 
attention—directed at the intended outcome of the movement—provides an advantage over an 
internal focus of attention—directed at the body or movement—in the learning and performance 
of a wide variety of motor skills (Bell & Hardy, 2009; Lohse et al., 2010; Wulf, 2007, 2013; 
Wulf, Mcconnel, Gärtner, Schwarz, & Gartner, 2002; Wulf & Su, 2007; Lohse & Sherwood, 
2012; Zachry et al., 2005). 
Lohse, Healy, and Sherwood (2014) provide a hypothesis of the role of attention in motor 
control based on an optimal control framework proposed by Sholz and Schöner (1999). This 
framework posits a space of all possible movements and divides the space four ways. The first 
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division is between goal-relevant dimensions—movement dimensions (e.g., joint angles or 
velocities) which influence whether the movement is successful—and redundant dimensions—
movement dimensions which do not influence whether the movement is successful. They add a 
further distinction between the uncontrolled manifold—the set of movement dimensions which 
can vary—and the controlled manifold—the set of movement dimensions which are not allowed 
to vary. Within this framework, implementing a strategy for successful movement amounts to 
aligning the controlled manifold with the set of goal-relevant dimensions and allowing the goal-
relevant dimensions to vary leads to diminished performance (Lohse et al., 2014).  
Using this framework, Lohse, Healy, and Sherwood (2014) propose the following 
hypothesis to explain the effects of attention on motor variability and performance: changing 
one’s focus of attention helps the motor system decide which movement dimensions are goal-
relevant and which are redundant, and hence which movement dimensions to control (i.e., 
prevent from varying). An external focus of attention leads to increased control of movement 
dimensions which are in fact goal-relevant (e.g., correlations between kinematics of distinct 
joints), while an internal focus of attention leads to increased control of bodily dimensions which 
are in fact not goal-relevant (e.g., kinematics of individual joints). This hypothesis is supported 
by their observation that an external focus of attention is associated with increased variability 
(i.e., decreased control) of individual joint angles and velocities but increased correlation among 
these dimensions over time, while an internal focus is associated with the opposite effects (Lohse 
et al., 2014).   
All this suggests that attention has modulatory effects on the activity of the motor system. 
Goal-oriented attention—that is, voluntary attention—facilitates performance by specifying the 
dimensions of movement over which it is optimal to enact control as well as the dimensions in 
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which it is optimal to allow for variability. The upshot of this is that voluntary attention is 
necessary for the optimal control of goal-oriented or voluntary movement.  
§3: Consciousness  
Ned Block famously distinguishes between two types of consciousness: access and 
phenomenal (Block, 1990, 1992, 1995). Phenomenally conscious mental states are associated 
with internal, subjective experiences: there is something it is like to be in them (Nagel, 1974). 
For example, consider the difference between what it is like to see red and what it is like to see 
blue: this difference is in terms of phenomenal properties. On the other hand, accessibly 
conscious mental states are characteristically available as inputs to executive functions, such as 
reasoning, speech, and action (Block, 1995). For example, my ability to report that I see a green 
Christmas tree requires that my perceptual representation of the tree is accessibly conscious.  
While attempts have been made to interpret certain behavioral results as successfully 
disentangling phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness (e.g., Block, 2005), there is 
good reason to be skeptical about this possibility. The reason for skepticism is that the only way 
to measure phenomenal consciousness is via reports about the content of an experience. These 
reports might be verbal, such as saying “I see the tree” or “I am experiencing the red circle”, 
motoric, such as pressing a button if a stimulus is visible, or they may take the form of wagers 
that represent one’s confidence about the content of one’s experience, such as betting $5 that the 
stimulus is present (Webb & Graziano, 2015). For each variety of report, the phenomenal—that 
is, experiential—content of a mental representation can be measured if and only if it is the 
representation is accessible—that is, available for report.  
Block (2005) argues that introspective reports should not be the “gold standard” for 
measuring phenomenal consciousness, since introspection is a species of metacognition and 
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young children and non-human animals have deficient capacities for metacognition compared to 
adult humans. Block advocates for the use of environmental reports, which require a subject to 
report “what the subject takes to be in front of him”, as an alternative to introspective reports, 
which require a subject to report “what the subject is experiencing” (Block, 2005).  
My response to the purported distinction between introspective and environmental reports 
is that “what the subject takes to be in front of him” and “what the subject is experiencing” are 
coextensive: they refer to the same thing. When one reports that there is no stimulus in front of 
him, we naturally infer from this report that he has no experience of the stimulus, and vice versa. 
This is because we assume the two types of reports to be describing the same thing. Therefore, if 
young children can provide environmental reports, then they possess the capacity to access the 
contents of their experiences (although they might be metacognitively deficient in other 
respects). More importantly, however, the takeaway here is that phenomenal consciousness and 
access consciousness cannot be experimentally disentangled. So, I will hereafter assume that the 
two phenomena are identical or always correlated: consciousness is always both phenomenal and 
accessible. On my view, each of the functional properties attributed to consciousness—such as, 
enabling voluntary attention or action—is associated with a distinctive subjective feeling of what 
it is like.  
Many contemporary theorists argue that consciousness serves a sort of supervisory role, 
whereby it contributes to the higher-order monitoring or guidance of certain types of mental and 
bodily activities (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011). This view traces back at least as far as William 
James, who characterized consciousness as “an organ added for the sake of steering a nervous 
system grown too complex to regulate itself” (James, 1890). Bernard Baars, in discussions of his 
famous Global Workspace Theory of consciousness, frequently mentions how consciousness 
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enables voluntary control (Baars, 1997, 2002, 2005). One result that he cites to support this claim 
is a study in which participants learned to control the firing patterns of a single motor neuron 
based on conscious auditory feedback which represents the neuron’s activity (Simard & 
Basmajian, 1967). Baars points out that such control has never been observed with unconscious 
feedback (Baars, 2005).  
Another interesting supervisory role for consciousness concerns its relationship with 
attention. Attention and consciousness almost always correlate (Mack & Rock, 1999; Prinz, 
2013). Nevertheless, there is extensive evidence which demonstrates that the two processes are 
behaviorally and neurally dissociable (Kentridge, Nijboer, & Heywood, 2008; C. Koch & 
Tsuchiya, 2007; McCormick, 1997; Norman, Heywood, & Kentridge, 2013; Webb, Igelström, 
Schurger, & Graziano, 2016). This intimate but dissociable relationship between attention and 
consciousness has inspired some to theorize that consciousness is a higher-order representation 
or model of attention (Webb & Graziano, 2015). The Attention Schema Theory developed by 
Michael Graziano argues that when a brain attends to a stimulus and computes a higher-order 
representation of this attentional state, the brain will conclude that it is aware (Webb & Graziano, 
2015). Graziano’s Attention Schema Theory treats conscious awareness as a perceptual and 
pragmatic internal model of attention. The internal model is perceptual because it aims to 
represent attention in its current state. According to the theory, the internal model represents the 
contents of attention as attended. Importantly, this internal model is best understood as a schema 
because while it represents attention and its contents, it does so in a coarse-grained and 
approximate manner. Since the attention schema describes attention with no more detail than is 
necessary to facilitate the guidance or control of attention, it can be thought of as essentially 
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pragmatic. In section four, I will discuss why possessing an internal model of attention would 
make it easier for the brain to optimally control attention.  
Evidence from recent fMRI studies implicate an area of the right temporal-parietal 
junction (rTPJ) in the computation of an attention schema (Kelly, Webb, Meier, Arcaro, & 
Graziano, 2014; Webb, Igelström, et al., 2016).  This brain region was consistently activated 
when participants were instructed to think about the attentional state of another person—that is, 
represent an attentional state. And most strikingly, decreasing activity in this region using 
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) leads to disruptions of conscious visual experience 
(operationalized as the capacity to report the presence of a white dot).  These results support not 
only the localization of the computation of an attention schema to the rTPJ, but also the necessity 
of such computational processes for normal conscious visual awareness.  
§4: Voluntary attention requires consciousness 
A large body of behavioral evidence suggests that voluntary attention is possible only 
with the help of consciousness (Ivanoff & Klein, 2003; Lambert, Naikar, McLachlan, & Aitken, 
1999; McCormick, 1997; Webb, Kean, & Graziano, 2016), whereas bottom-up, stimulus-driven 
attention dominates in the absence of consciousness (Lambert et al., 1999; McCormick, 1997; 
Tsushima, Sasaki, & Watanabe, 2006).  
Additionally, a key prediction of the Attention Schema Theory—described in §2—is that 
attention should suffer severe deficits of control in the absence of consciousness. There is a 
handful of results consistent with this prediction, and they reveal a pattern which indicates the 
specific variety of attentional control that is compromised in the absence of consciousness. In a 
study in which participants were presented with lateralized cues which indicated a subsequent 
contralateral presentation of a target, the extent to which participants could resist the reflex to 
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attend to the side of the cue was affected by whether they were consciously aware of the cue 
(McCormick, 1997). When participants were consciously aware of the cue, they could 
successfully voluntarily attend to the side where the target would be presented. However, when 
participants were not consciously aware of the cue, they just focused on the side where the cue 
was presented. In another study, it was observed that when participants perform a letter 
identification task with distracting peripheral stimuli, they perform better if they are consciously 
aware of the distracting stimuli than if they are not consciously aware of the distracting stimuli 
(Tsushima et al., 2006). In both studies, it was observed that the ability to resist bottom-up 
attentional capture is diminished in the absence of awareness. This suggests that the top-down, 
voluntary control of attention may require consciousness. 
An important feature of the Attention Schema Theory is its relation to model-based 
dynamical systems control, an engineering framework which assumes that to achieve optimal 
control of a complex dynamical system, it is useful for the controller to have access to an internal 
model of the system being controlled (Camacho & Bordons, 2007a; Camacho & Bordons, 
2007b; Webb, Kean, & Graziano, 2016). Since the Attention Schema theory treats consciousness 
as an internal model used for the control of attention, it predicts that the absence of 
consciousness will result in the deficits of attentional control analogous to the characteristic 
behavior of dynamical systems whose controller is missing an internal model. These deficits 
include a diminished capacity for task-relevant attentional focus, diminished ability to resist task-
irrelevant attentional focus, and increased likelihood of attention being influenced by external 
factors (Graziano & Botvinick, 2002; Scheidt, Conditt, Secco, & Mussa-Ivaldi, 2005; Webb, 
Kean, & Graziano, 2016; Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995).  In a recent study, all three of 
these predicted attentional deficits were observed. (Webb, Kean, et al., 2016). In this study, when 
VOLUNTARY ACTION REQUIRES CONSCIOUSNESS 13 
conscious awareness was absent, it was more difficult for participants to maintain focus on goal-
relevant stimuli. Additionally, the ability to resist attentional capture by a task-irrelevant stimulus 
was reduced and attentional selection was more biased by the contrast of the stimulus, in the 
absence of consciousness.  A plausible explanation for these latter findings is that the default 
state of attention, in the absence of top-down influence from goals and the like, is to be 
controlled by bottom-up biases such as contrast.  If so, then it appears consciousness may be 
necessary for attention to be guided in a goal-oriented manner. 
§5: Voluntary action requires consciousness  
Based on the above discussion, I propose the following argument for the hypothesis that 
consciousness is necessary for voluntary action: 
P1. P voluntarily performs A only if P’s goal to perform A guides A. 
P2. A goal G optimally guides an action only if G influences attention to signals associated  
with G-relevant action dimensions (GAD). 
P3. G optimally guides attention to GAD only if consciousness enables goals to influence  
attention. 
C1. So, P voluntarily performs an action A only if consciousness enables goals to influence     
       attention.  
For the purposes of this paper, I assume that P1 is uncontroversial. It is difficult to imagine a 
scenario in which one voluntarily performs an action yet lacks any goal-like state to guide or 
inform this action.1 P2 specifies the necessity of attention for voluntary action and is supported 
                                                
1 One potential class of counterexamples includes cases where an individual (i) performs some action A1, 
but (ii) never had the goal to perform A1, (iii) had the goal to perform a similar but distinct action A2, nevertheless 
(iv) seems to perform A1 voluntarily.  For example, suppose Bob intends to shoot a deer, sees a deer-looking 
creature and shoots it, but the creature turns out to be a deer-looking goat. In this case, Bob never had no intention to 
kill that goat. Yet, perhaps it is intuitive that Bob voluntarily killed the goat. My intuition is that Bob did not 
voluntarily kill the goat. At most, he voluntarily killed what he knew was there: a deer-looking creature. 
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by the theories and experimental results presented in section three of this essay. P3 specifies the 
necessity of consciousness for voluntary attention and is supported by the theories and 
experimental results presented in section four of this essay. C1 entails that voluntary action 
requires consciousness—and it is logically entailed by the conjunction of P1, P2, and P3.  
 §6: Feeling of voluntariness  
The feeling of voluntariness refers to the subjective experience as of having conscious 
control over one’s action: it is the feeling that consciousness contributes to the guidance of action 
(Wegner, 2003). Nearly all human actions are associated with this feeling of voluntariness and I 
would wager that the widespread folk-psychological belief in the existence of free will is based 
primarily on this feeling of voluntariness. For many decades, the common view among 
psychologists and neuroscientists has been that the feeling of voluntariness is illusory: that is, 
while it may seem that consciousness contributes to the guidance of action, this is often not 
(perhaps, never) the case.  
One prominent hypothesis about the feeling of voluntariness, which I will call the 
prospective-retroactive-agreement hypothesis or PRA for short, is that the feeling of 
voluntariness arises when there is agreement between the prospective signals representing the 
goal to move and the retroactive signals representing the sensory consequences of the movement 
(Farrer et al., 2008; Haggard & Clark, 2003). Importantly, most of the retroactive signals 
mentioned above are simultaneous with the movement itself, since movements take time to 
complete.  So, PRA is consistent with the hypothesis that the subjective feeling of voluntariness 
contributes to the coordination of voluntary action. PRA is primarily supported by studies which 
show correlations between reported feelings of involuntariness and  disagreement between the 
intended and actual outcomes of a movement (Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009; Wegner, 2003). 
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Numerous brain regions have been implicated in the processing of this disagreement, which is 
thought to underlie the feeling of involuntariness (Wegner, 2003).   
Other studies on the feeling of voluntariness focus on the subjective temporal difference 
between the onset of a movement and the onset of its effect. One finding is that this subjective 
temporal difference gets smaller following a movement made “by choice”, and gets larger 
following a motor reflex induced by TMS (Haggard et al., 2002).  The reduction of this 
subjective temporal difference—known as the binding effect—is often used as a proxy for 
measuring the feeling of voluntariness (Moore et al., 2009). In a more recent study, it was 
observed that when participants are not told in advance which event-onset to remember among 
(G) the goal, (M) the movement, or (C) the consequences of the movement, the perceived 
temporal difference is much smaller. In such conditions, subjects are nearly unable to distinguish 
between the onsets of G, M , and C (Haggard & Cole, 2007). According to Haggard and Cole, 
when participants are not told in advance whether they are to remember the onset of G, M, or C, 
participants do not direct their attention to G, M, or C.  Given this, the authors infer that a lack of 
attention to G, M, and C leads to increased binding effects. If (a) binding effect is a valid implicit 
measure of feeling of voluntariness and (b) the binding effect is strongest when attentional focus 
is not directed to G, M, or C, then it is reasonable to infer that the most robust feelings of 
voluntariness arise when attention is not focused on G, M, or C. However, I think there are 
reasons to doubt (a) and (b).  
First, there is good reason to doubt Haggard and Cole’s interpretation of their results and 
hence (b). It is unlikely that when the participants are not told in advance whether they should 
remember the onset of G, M, or C, that the participants do not attend to G, M, or C. After all, the 
participants still understand that they must recall the onset of one of G, M, or C, they just do not 
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know which one. Rather than simply not attending to any of the events—a strategy which would 
render the task of accurately reporting the onset of one of the events difficult or impossible—it is 
much more likely that the participants alternate their attentional focus between the events. This 
alternating attention strategy, while not quite as poor as the strategy of non-attention which 
Haggard and Cole attribute to their participants, is likely to yield the inaccurate estimates of the 
onsets of G, M, and C which are observed in the study. Furthermore, if participants divide their 
attention between G, M, and C, this may interfere with the ordinary dynamics of attention 
involved in voluntary action. If so, then participants may in fact feel less conscious control—that 
is, a diminished feeling of voluntariness—when they are not told in advance whether they must 
recall the onset of G, M, or C, precisely because the normal processes of voluntary control are 
disrupted by the task demands.  
Concerning (a), it is an open empirical question whether the binding effect is a valid 
measure of the feeling of voluntariness.  One way to test whether the binding effect is a valid 
measure of the feeling of voluntariness is to check it against alternative valid measures, such as 
having participants judge on a scale ranging from ‘no control’ to ‘complete control’ the extent to 
which they thought they controlled their action (Chambon & Haggard, 2012). To my knowledge, 
no comparison between these two measures has been reported in print.  
 The most influential results in the literature on the feeling of voluntariness come from 
Benjamin Libet’s experiments, which showed that a readiness potential in motor cortex regularly 
occurred 350-400 ms before the time at which participants became consciously aware of their 
goal to flex their wrist (Libet, 1985). The conclusion often drawn from this result is that the 
feeling of voluntariness does not initiate movement, since it always arises after the brain has 
already initiated the causal chain of neural activity that will reliably lead to action (P Haggard et 
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al., 2002; Patrick Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Wegner, 2003). This result suggests that the feeling of 
voluntariness arises prior to the action, since participants in Libet’s experiment became 
consciously aware of their goal to flex their wrist 100-150 ms before they flexed their wrist. But, 
more importantly, the Libet findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the feeling of 
voluntariness contributes to voluntary action by enabling goals to influence attention.2 This 
contribution of consciousness could occur at any time between the onset and conclusion of an 
action. So, the Libet findings do not support the hypothesis that consciousness has no causal 
contribution to action. All results presented above are consistent with the hypothesis that the 
feeling of voluntariness contributes to the coordination of voluntary action.  
 §7: A theoretical narrative about voluntary action  
What emerges from the arguments in sections five and six is a theoretical narrative about 
the cognitive mechanisms that jointly enable voluntary action. I will hereafter refer to this 
narrative as N. A rough draft of N is as follows: prior to performing a voluntary action, one has a 
goal about what to do. Next, this goal is used in conjunction with consciousness—understood as 
a useful internal model of attention—to optimally guide attention toward dimensions of the 
subsequent movement that are goal-relevant. Attention then enhances the processing of the 
signals associated with these goal-relevant movement dimensions, thereby enabling the motor 
system to control the limbs in a way which is optimal with respect to the initial goal. When a 
voluntary action is occurring, consciousness qua functional incorporates (at minimum) 
information about goals, the contents of attention, and the process of attention. But, perhaps at 
the same time, consciousness qua phenomenal has a different set of properties, such as what it is 
                                                
2 Another possible role for consciousness to play in voluntary action is as a mechanism by which the brain 
can veto unfolding actions before they are completed. Thanks to Eric Lormand for reminding me of this possibility. 
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like to perform a voluntary action. In other words, perhaps, when one is performing a voluntary 
action, one’s consciousness qua phenomenal is simply the subjective feeling of voluntariness. 
§8: Implications and shortcomings of N  
S leads to some testable predictions. According to N, voluntary attention and 
consciousness are critical causal nodes that connect goals to actions. Therefore, in the absence of 
either of these processes, voluntary action will not be possible. Furthermore, given the way in 
which N connects voluntary action and the feeling of voluntariness, the absence of consciousness 
or voluntary attention should also lead to disruptions in the feeling of voluntariness. Also, to the 
extent that there are well-defined neural mechanisms underlying the processes of consciousness 
and voluntary attention, modulation of the activity of these mechanisms via TMS should affect 
the capacity to produce voluntary actions, as well as the feeling of voluntariness. Additionally, 
one should find systematically coordinated activity between regions underlying the computation 
of goals—such as areas of prefrontal cortex—and regions underlying the computation of a 
higher-order model of attention—such as the TPJ—and regions responsible for attentional 
control—such as areas in the dorsal PPC—during both voluntary attention and voluntary action. 
Further, the robustness of this coordinated neural activity should be positively correlated with the 
feeling of voluntariness. 
 N also has some interesting philosophical features. First, N vindicates the intuition 
presented at the start of this essay that voluntary action requires consciousness. Second, N 
assigns a specific causal function to consciousness, thereby rebuffing the view that consciousness 
is purely epiphenomenal (Huxley, 1874). Also, if N is correct, then the subjective feeling of 
voluntariness is normally veridical, rather than illusory: it is not merely the experience as of 
acting voluntarily, rather it is the experience of acting voluntarily. Another important feature of N 
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is that it provides a purely naturalistic conception of voluntariness, motivated by results in 
contemporary psychology and neuroscience. N also has the virtue of eschewing debates about 
the compatibility of voluntary action with determinism. Whether the physical processes 
underlying an action are deterministic and linear or stochastic and non-linear is totally irrelevant 
to whether the action is voluntary. If the appropriate interplay between goals, consciousness, 
attention, and action obtain, the action will be voluntary, regardless of whether the underlying 
processes are deterministic. 
However, N is highly inadequate as a theory of voluntary action because it fails to 
provide specific details about the neural and computational realizations of the interactions 
between goals, consciousness, attention, and action. This shortcoming is partly explained by the 
difficulty I had in recognizing meaningful patterns of results in the contemporary literature 
concerning such mechanisms. For example, how is it that the brain constructs an internal model 
of attention? And what are the mechanisms that mediate the connection between goals and 
attention? In the future, it would be worthwhile to try to develop computational models which 
make precise predictions about statistical patterns of behavioral and neuroimaging data.   
Also, there is room for skepticism about whether voluntary action according to S is the 
sort of thing that can ground moral responsibility. After all, there are cases in which an action 
would be declared voluntary by S, but which nevertheless are not actions for which an agent 
should be held morally responsible. The most obvious type of case concerns actions which are 
coerced. For example, suppose some guy Bob is a store and a fellow shopper walking near Bob 
grabs him, brandishes a handgun, and tells him that he must steal an item from the store, or else 
he will be shot. Bob, out of fear for his life, decides—that is, forms a goal—to steal the item. 
This goal, with the help of consciousness, guides attention which in turn guides the motor system 
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in a way that leads to the successful execution of the movements required to steal the item. 
According to S, Bob’s stealing the item was a voluntary action. Nevertheless, it seems strange to 
say that Bob is morally responsible—such that he can be justly blamed—for stealing the item, 
since he was coerced by fear of death to do it. So, voluntary action, as defined by S, is not 
sufficient to ground moral responsibility.  
A somewhat ad hoc solution to this problem is just to say that an action for which one is 
morally responsible is one which is both voluntary (as defined by S) and not coerced. However, I 
think a more principled solution would be to add a reflective endorsement component to the 
account of voluntary action in S (Frankfurt, 1971). For example, if we add to this account of 
voluntary action the requirement that the brain wants to have some goal to act, then the account 
avoids the problem described above. In the scenario presented above, although Bob has the goal 
to steal the item, he does not want to have this goal. If wanting or identifying with or otherwise 
endorsing a goal is incorporated as a requirement in the account of voluntary action, then the 
account would predict that Bob’s action was involuntary—a prediction which is in harmony with 
the intuition that Bob is not morally responsible for his action.    
§9: Closing remarks  
In this essay, I have reviewed a body of cognitive science literature about attention, 
consciousness, action, and the connections between these phenomena. I leveraged ideas and 
experimental results from this literature as support for two claims: (1) voluntary action requires 
voluntary attention and (2) voluntary attention requires consciousness. These claims jointly entail 
that voluntary action requires consciousness. I also reviewed a body of cognitive science 
literature about the subjective feeling of voluntariness. Lastly, I presented and critically 
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examined a theoretical narrative that describes voluntary action as involving an interplay of 
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